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Secure Communication Via a Wireless Energy
Harvesting Untrusted Relay
Sanket S. Kalamkar and Adrish Banerjee
Abstract—The broadcast nature of the wireless medium allows
unintended users to eavesdrop the confidential information trans-
mission. In this regard, we investigate the problem of secure
communication between a source and a destination via a wireless
energy harvesting untrusted node which acts as a helper to relay
the information; however, the source and destination nodes wish to
keep the information confidential from the relay node. To realize
the positive secrecy rate, we use destination-assisted jamming.
Being an energy-starved node, the untrusted relay harvests energy
from the received radio frequency signals, which include the
source’s information signal and the destination’s jamming signal.
Thus, we utilize the jamming signal efficiently by leveraging it as
a useful energy source. At the relay, to enable energy harvesting
and information processing, we adopt power splitting (PS) and
time switching (TS) policies. To evaluate the secrecy performance
of this proposed scenario, we derive analytical expressions for two
important metrics, viz., the secrecy outage probability and the
ergodic secrecy rate. The numerical analysis reveals the design
insights into the effects of different system parameters like power
splitting ratio, energy harvesting time, target secrecy rate, transmit
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), relay location, and energy conversion
efficiency factor, on the secrecy performance. Specifically, the
PS policy achieves better optimal secrecy outage probability and
optimal ergodic secrecy rate than that of the TS policy at higher
target secrecy rate and transmit SNR, respectively.
Index Terms—Destination-assisted jamming, ergodic secrecy
rate, secrecy outage probability, untrusted relay, wireless energy
harvesting.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Wireless Energy Harvesting and Cooperative Relaying
ENERGY harvesting is a popular source of energy to powerwireless devices [1]–[3]. It holds the potential to prolong
the lifetime of energy-constrained nodes and simultaneously
avoids the frequent recharging and replacement of batteries,
which otherwise would be inconvenient or unacceptable (e.g.,
medical devices implanted inside a human body). Besides
harvesting energy from natural sources like solar, thermal, and
wind, the radio frequency (RF) signals in the surrounding
wireless environment is a viable source of energy. Exploiting
that RF signals can carry both energy and information together,
[4]–[6] have proposed the simultaneous wireless energy har-
vesting and information transfer from the same received RF
signals. Since it is difficult for a receiver to harvest energy
and process information from the same signal, two practical
policies for the wireless energy harvesting and information
processing are proposed in [6]–[8]. One policy is the power
splitting policy where the receiver splits the received power
between energy harvesting and information processing. The
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second policy involves time switching which divides the time
between energy harvesting and information processing.
Such simultaneous energy harvesting and information pro-
cessing has an application in cooperative relaying [8]–[16].
Using the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, the source
transmits the information to an intermediate node, that retrans-
mits it to the destination. In this setup, the relay harvests
energy from the received RF information signal and uses it
further to forward the information to the destination. The energy
harvesting along with the information transfer can prolong the
lifetime of a relay, which in turn, facilitates the information
cooperation.
B. Physical-Layer Security and Untrusted Relaying
Although the broadcast nature of the wireless medium has
facilitated the cooperative communication, it has also allowed
unintended nodes, also known as eavesdroppers, to hear the
confidential information transmission between the source and
the intended destination via a relay, leading to the insecure
communication. Traditional approaches to achieve the secure
communication include upper-layer cryptographic techniques
which require intensive key distribution and management. Un-
like this paradigm, the physical-layer information-theoretic se-
curity achieves the secure communication by exploiting the
nature of the wireless channel. In this regard, Wyner introduced
the wiretap channel and showed that the perfect secure commu-
nication was possible without relying on private keys [17].
As to the cooperative relaying, the works in [18]–[25] have
studied the physical-layer security in the presence of external
eavesdroppers that are different from the relay and try to inter-
cept the source-relay and/or relay-destination communications.
Even in the absence of external eavesdroppers, the secure
communication between source and destination may still be a
concern, as one may wish to keep the source-destination com-
munication secret from the relay itself despite its cooperation
in forwarding the information [26]. In this case, the relay is
considered as an eavesdropper. The model of untrusted relay
has practical applications in defence, financial, and government
networks, where all users do not have the same rights to access
the information. Also, if the relay belongs to a different network,
it may not have the privilege to access the data as that of the
source and the destination.
In [27], the authors show that even the communication via
an untrusted relay can be beneficial for the relay channel with
orthogonal components. The works in [28], [29] show that the
positive secrecy rate is achievable with the destination-assisted
jamming, where the destination sends jamming signals dur-
ing the source-relay communication. The references [30]–[35]
2investigate the information-theoretic security performance for
amplify-and-forward (AF) relays under the fading channel and
destination-assisted jamming. The work in [36] studies the se-
crecy outage probability performance of the communication via
an untrusted multi-antenna relay. In [37], the authors advocate
the use of friendly jammers to secure the communication via an
untrusted relay. To achieve secure as well as spectral efficient
communication, the authors in [38] propose link adaptation and
relay assignment. With distributed beamforming and opportunis-
tic relaying, the reference [39] studies the capacity scaling and
diversity order for secure relaying. In [40], the authors examine
the secure relay-assisted communication, where legitimate users,
rather considering the relay completely untrusted, have a degree
of trust about the relay.
C. Wireless Energy Harvesting with Physical-Layer Security
Recently, with wireless energy harvesting, a few works have
studied the physical-layer security in the presence of exter-
nal eavesdroppers for different scenarios like point-to-point
communication with a single antenna [41], [42] and multiple
antennas [43]–[46], and the cooperative communication via a re-
lay [47]–[50]. In [47], in the presence of the external energy har-
vesting receiver, the authors study the secure relay beamforming
with simultaneous wireless information and energy transfer. The
work in [48] investigates the secrecy performance for an AF
relay wiretap channel when the external helpers, who act as
jammers to the eavesdropper, harvest energy from the source’s
transmission. In the presence of an external eavesdropper,
in [49], authors have studied the secure communication between
a source and a destination via multiple energy harvesting relays;
while the work in [50] investigates the secrecy performance of
the source-destination communication via an energy harvesting
relay with multiple antennas. However, the works in [47]–
[50] assume the relay to be trusted, and external eavesdroppers
attempt to intercept the relay-assisted communication between
the source and the destination. Also, the works on untrusted
relay till now have assumed that the conventional energy source,
such as battery, powers the relay (see, e.g., [26]–[34], [36]–[40]).
In this work, we address the problem of secure communica-
tion via an energy harvesting untrusted relay. When an untrusted
relay harvests energy from the received RF signals, the jamming
signal can act as a potential energy source besides its original
purpose of realizing the secure communication via untrusted
relay. This allows us to use the jamming signal efficiently.
D. Contributions and Key Results
In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance of a two-
hop communication between a source and a destination, where
the source uses an AF wireless energy harvesting untrusted
relay to forward the confidential information to the legitimate
destination. To keep the information secret from the relay, we
consider the destination-assisted jamming. The relay harvests
energy from received RF signals, which include the information
signal from the source and the jamming signal from the des-
tination. We use power splitting (PS) and time switching (TS)
receiver architectures [6] at the relay to facilitate the energy
harvesting and information processing. We summarize the main
contributions and key results below.
Information transmission
Jamming signal
First-hop
Second-hop
First-hop
Fig. 1. System Model for the secure communication between a source (S) and
a destination (D) via an energy harvesting untrusted relay (R) with destination-
assisted jamming.
• With the jamming signal leveraged as a useful energy
source under both PS and TS policies, for an energy har-
vesting AF relay, we derive analytical expressions for two
important measures of secrecy performance—the secrecy
outage probability and the ergodic secrecy rate.
• We further compare PS and TS policies, where we show
that, at higher target secrecy rate and transmit signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR), PS policy achieves lower secrecy outage
probability and higher ergodic secrecy rate, respectively.
• The numerical results also show that the power splitting
ratio in PS policy and energy harvesting time in TS policy
have both constructive and destructive effects on the secure
communication between source and destination. Thus, the
optimal power splitting ratio in PS policy and the optimal
energy harvesting time in TS policy that maximize the
secrecy performance do exist.
• In addition, for both PS and TS policies, the numerical
analysis shows that, the optimal secrecy performance is
achieved when the relay is located closer to the destination
than to the source. This is in contrast with the case where
the wireless energy harvesting relay is considered to be
trusted, and the optimum location of the relay is closer to
the source.
E. Organization of the Paper
We structure the rest of the paper as follows. Section II de-
scribes the system model for the two-hop secure communication
via an energy harvesting untrusted relay using the destination-
assisted jamming. In Sections III and IV, utilizing the jamming
signal as a useful energy source, we derive analytical expres-
sions for the secrecy outage probability and the ergodic secrecy
rate for PS policy and TS policy based relaying. We present
numerical results in Section V, where we also discuss the effects
of different system parameters on the secrecy performance of
the relay-assisted communication and obtain various design
insights. Finally, we provide concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Destination-Assisted Jamming and Channel Model
As shown in Fig. 1, a source (S) communicates with a
destination (D) via an amplify-and-forward (AF) energy har-
vesting relay (R). Despite relay’s information cooperation, the
source and destination nodes wish to keep the information secret
from the relay. To maintain the confidentiality of the source
information, the destination sends a jamming signal to the relay
when source transmits the information to the relay. Each node
operates in a half-duplex mode and has a single antenna. The
3direct link between S and D is unavailable.1 Let us denote the
coefficient of the channel between nodes i and j by hij . We
consider a quasi-static block-fading Rayleigh channel between
two nodes, as in [8], [12], [30], [31]. That is, the channel
remains constant over a slot-duration of T during which S
transmits to D via R and changes independently from one slot
to another. The channel power gain is given by |hij |2, which
has exponential distribution with mean λij , i.e.,
f|hij|2(x) =
1
λij
exp
(
−
x
λij
)
, x ≥ 0, (1)
where f|hij|2(x) is the probability density function of random
variable |hij |2. We assume the channel between R and D
reciprocal, as in [30]–[33], [36], i.e., hRD = hDR. In this
work, the source is assumed to have no channel state information
(CSI), while the CSI of S−R and R−D channels are available
at the relay and destination, respectively [8]–[10], [12].
B. Energy Harvesting and Information Processing Model
The untrusted relay harvests energy from the received RF
signals which it uses to forward the source’s information to the
destination. To activate the energy harvesting circuitry at the
relay, the received power must exceed the minimum threshold
power θH [3], [51], [52].2 We assume that the relay has no
other energy source and uses the harvested energy completely
for the transmission as the power consumed by the relay’s
transmit/receive circuitry is negligible compared to the power
required for the transmission [8], [12].
We adopt following two different receiver architectures based
policies at the relay to separately harvest energy from the
received RF signals and process the information [7].
1. Power splitting (PS) policy: The relay uses a part of the
received power to harvest the energy and the remaining
part for the information processing.
2. Time switching (TS) policy: The relay switches between
the energy harvesting and the information processing. That
is, the relay uses a fraction of the time of a slot to harvest
the energy and the remaining time for the information
processing and relaying.
Note that the relay may attempt to decode the source informa-
tion with the power used for the information processing.
III. POWER SPLITTING POLICY BASED RELAYING
Fig. 2 shows the power splitting (PS) policy based relaying
protocol, where the source-to-destination communication hap-
pens in a slot of duration T . Two phases of equal duration
T/2 divide the slot. In the first phase, the source transmits
information to the relay with power PS . At the same time, the
destination sends a jamming signal with power PD to the relay
to maintain the confidentiality of the source information from
the relay. The relay uses a fraction β of the received power
1Since the destination operates in a half-duplex mode and sends the jamming
signal to the relay during the source’s transmission, it cannot receive the
information from the source.
2The threshold θH is usually between −30 dBm to −10 dBm, depending
on various factors like channel conditions, frequency of the received RF signals,
and energy harvesting circuitry type (linear, non-linear, tunable, etc.) [3].
Fig. 2. Power splitting policy for the secure communication via an energy
harvesting untrusted relay.
for energy harvesting and the remaining (1 − β) portion for
information processing, where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Using the harvested
energy, in the second phase, the relay forwards the received
information to destination after amplification.
A. Energy Harvesting at Relay
In the aforementioned PS policy, the relay harvests energy
EH given as
EH = ηβ
(
PS |hSR|
2 + PD|hDR|
2
)
(T/2), (2)
where η is the energy conversion efficiency factor with 0 <
η ≤ 1, which is dependent on the energy harvesting circuitry
of the relay. The terms PS |hSR|2 and PD|hDR|2 in (2) denote
the power received at the relay due to the information signal
from the source and the jamming signal from the destination,
respectively. In the second phase of duration T/2, the relay’s
transmit power to forward the information to destination is given
as
PH =
EH
T/2
= ηβ
(
PS |hSR|
2 + PD|hDR|
2
)
. (3)
B. Information Processing and Relaying Protocol
In phase one, the received signal yR for the information
processing at the relay is given by
yR =
√
(1 − β)PShSRxS +
√
(1− β)PDhDRxD + nR, (4)
where xS is the source message with unit power, xD is the unit
power jamming signal sent by the destination, and nR is the
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the relay. We assume
that the power splitting does not affect the noise power [11],
[53]. Based on the received signal yR in (4), the relay may
attempt to decode the source message xS . We can write the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the relay as
γR =
(1 − β)PS |hSR|
2
(1− β)PD |hDR|2 +N0
, (5)
where N0 is the noise power of AWGN nR.
In phase two, the relay amplifies the received signal yR by a
factor ξ based on its power constraint and forwards the resultant
signal xR to the destination, which is given as
xR = ξyR (6)
=
√
PH
(1− β)PS |hSR|2 + (1− β)PD |hDR|2 +N0
yR.
(7)
4Then, we substitute (4) in (6) and then use (6) to write the
received signal y′D at the destination as
y′D = hRDxR + nD
= ξ
√
(1− β)PShSRhRDxS
+ ξ
√
(1− β)PDhRDhDRxD + ξhRDnR + nD, (8)
where nD is the AWGN at the destination with power N0.
Since xD is the jamming signal sent by the destination itself
to the relay in phase one, the destination can remove the term
ξ
√
(1 − β)PDhRDhDRxD from (8) and decode the source
information from the rest of the received signal.3 Thus, the
resultant received signal yD at the destination becomes
yD = ξ
√
(1− β)PShSRhRDxS + ξhRDnR + nD. (9)
Finally, substituting PH from (3) in (7), and then using ξ
from (7) in (9), we get
yD =
√
ηβ(1 − β)PS (PS |hSR|2 + PD|hDR|2)hSRhRDxS√
(1− β)PS |hSR|2 + (1− β)PD |hDR|2 +N0
+
√
ηβ (PS |hSR|2 + PD|hDR|2)hRDnR√
(1− β)PS |hSR|2 + (1− β)PD |hDR|2 +N0
+ nD.
(10)
The first term on the right hand side of (10) represents the
signal part, while the second and third terms correspond to the
total received noise at the destination. Then, the SNR at the
destination can be written as
γD =
ηβ(1 − β)PS |hSR|
2|hRD|
2
ηβ|hRD|2N0 +N0(1− β) +
N20
(PS |hSR|2+PD |hDR|2)
.
(11)
C. Secure Communication via an Untrusted Relay
When the relay is considered untrusted, we can write the
instantaneous secrecy rate Rsec of the relay-assisted communi-
cation as [54]
Rsec =
1
2
[log2 (1 + γD)− log2 (1 + γR)]
+
=
1
2
[
log2
(
1 + γD
1 + γR
)]+
, (12)
where [x]+ = max(x, 0). The factor 12 represents the effective
communication time between the source and the destination.
For the rest of the Section III, we assume PS = PD = P for
analytical tractability.
3In the case of channel estimation errors, the destination will have inaccurate
knowledge of the channel gain on the relay-destination link, due to which
it will not be able to cancel the jamming signal completely, causing self-
interference. This, in turn, will reduce the received SNR at the destination,
deteriorating the secrecy performance. Given the scope of this paper is to analyze
the untrusted nature of an energy harvesting relay on the source-destination
communication, we restrict ourselves to study the secrecy performance without
channel estimation errors.
1) Secrecy Outage Probability: The secrecy outage probabil-
ity is an important measure of the secrecy performance. It allows
us to determine the probability of attaining a target secrecy rate.
Given the energy harvesting circuitry of the relay is active, we
can express the secrecy outage probability as [54]
Pout = P (Rsec < Rth) , (13)
where P(·) denotes the probability, Rsec is the instantaneous
secrecy rate given by (12), and Rth is the target secrecy rate.
Then, substituting γR from (5) and γD from (11), we can rewrite
(13) as
Pout = P


1 + ηβ(1−β)P |hSR|
2|hRD|
2
(N0ηβ|hRD|2+N0(1−β))+
N2
0
P(|hSR|
2+|hRD|
2)
1 + (1−β)P |hSR|
2
(1−β)P |hRD|
2+N0
< 22Rth

.
(14)
We can further express the secrecy outage probability in (14)
analytically as given in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The secrecy outage probability for PS policy
can be approximately expressed as
Pout ≈ 1−
1
λRD
∫ ∞
θ1
exp
(
−
δ − 1
ν(x)λSR
−
x
λRD
)
dx, (15)
where δ = 22Rth with
θ1 =
δ−1
1−β +
√(
δ−1
1−β
)2
+ 4δP
ηβN0
2(P/N0)
, (16a)
and
ν(x) = (1− β)
(
ηβPx
N0 (ηβx + (1− β))
−
Pδ
P (1 − β)x+N0
)
.
(16b)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Equation (15) is obtained using the high SNR approximation
of the received SNR at the destination given as
γD ≈
ηβ(1− β)P |hSR|
2|hRD|
2
N0 (ηβ|hRD|2 + (1− β))
. (17)
Equation (17) can be obtained from the exact expression given
in (11) of γD by neglecting the term N
2
0
(PS |hSR|2+PD |hDR|2)
(due
to negligible N20 at high SNR) from the denominator of (11).
The approximation in (17) is analytically more tractable than
the exact expression in (14).4 Although the integral in (15)
cannot be expressed in a closed form, it can be easily evaluated
numerically as the integrand consists of elementary functions.
As aforementioned in Section II-B, the received power at
the relay must be greater than the minimum power threshold
θH to activate the energy harvesting circuitry. Using channel
reciprocity on the relay-destination link, we can write the
received power PR at the relay as
PR =
(
P |hSR|
2 + P |hRD|
2
)
. (18)
4In fact, the complex structure of (14) does not allow us to get an exact
analytical expression for the secrecy outage probability. This is because, the
term
(
|hSR|
2 + |hDR|
2
)
in the denominator of (14) prevents the separation
of two random variables |hSR|2 and |hRD|2, which in turn, impedes the
simplification of (14) to get an exact analytical expression.
5If the received power PR is less than the power threshold
θH , the energy harvesting circuitry at the relay stays inactive,
leading to the power outage. The following proposition gives
the expression for the power outage probability P (PR < θH).
Proposition 2. We write the power outage probability Pp,out
as follows:
Pp,out =


1− λSR
λSR−λRD
exp
(
− θH
PλSR
)
− λRD
λRD−λSR
exp
(
− θH
PλRD
)
, if λSR 6= λRD
Υ
(
2, θH
PλSR
)
, if λSR = λRD,
(19)
where Υ(a, t) =
∫ t
0 x
a−1 exp(−x)dx is the lower incomplete
Gamma function.
Proof: See Appendix B.
For an energy constrained untrusted relay, a secrecy outage
can also occur if the power received by the relay is insufficient
to activate the energy harvesting circuitry [52]. Thus, combining
with (15), we can write the overall secrecy outage probability
P sout as [52]
P sout = Pp,out + (1− Pp,out)Pout, (20)
where Pout is given by (15).
2) Probability of Positive Secrecy Rate: The destination-
assisted jamming helps to keep the source information confi-
dential from the relay and achieve the secure communication.
In this regard, the probability Ppos of achieving strictly positive
secrecy rate is an important measure of the secrecy performance.
We provide the exact and approximate analytical expression for
Ppos in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. We write the exact and high SNR approximation
analytical expressions for the probability of achieving strictly
positive secrecy rate Ppos as follows:
Ppos = (1 − Pp,out)
[
exp
(
−
θ3
λRD
)
+
1
λRD
∫ θ3
θ2
exp
(
−
(
ψ(x)
λSR
+
x
λRD
))
dx
]
(21a)
≈ (1− Pp,out) exp
(
−
√
θ2
λ2RD
)
, (high SNR approximation),
(21b)
where
θ2 = A, (22a)
θ3 =

B
2
+
√(
B
2
)2
+
(
−
A
3
)3
1
3
+

B
2
−
√(
B
2
)2
+
(
−
A
3
)3
1
3
, (22b)
with A = N0
ηβP
and B = N
2
0
ηβ(1−β)P 2 , and
ψ(x) =
N20
P (1− β)(ηβPx2 −N0)
− x. (22c)
with
ψ(x)


< 0, 0 ≤ x < θ2
≥ 0, θ2 ≤ x ≤ θ3,
< 0, θ3 < x <∞.
(23)
θ2 is the positive root of the equation g(x) = ηβPx2−N0 = 0,
while θ3 is the real root of ψ(x) = 0 that is equivalent to a
cubic equation given as x3 −Ax− B = 0.
Proof: See Appendix C.
3) Ergodic Secrecy Rate: Another important secrecy metric
is the ergodic secrecy rate, which is the maximum transmis-
sion rate at which the eavesdropper fails to decode the secret
information that is being transmitted. We can obtain the ergodic
secrecy rate by averaging out the instantaneous secrecy rate Rsec
over all possible channel realizations. Therefore, in the case of
untrusted relaying, the ergodic secrecy rate, with the inclusion
of power outage probability Pp,out given by (19), can be given
as
R¯sec = (1− Pp,out)E{Rsec}
= (1− Pp,out)E
{
1
2
[
log2
(
1 + γD
1 + γR
)]+}
, (24)
where E{·} is the expectation operator. Using (5) and (11) in
(24), we can write the analytical expression for R¯sec as
R¯sec = (1− Pp,out)
×
∫ ∞
x=0
∫ ∞
y=0

1
2
log2

1 +
ηβ(1−β)Pxy
ηβN0y+N0(1−β)+
N2
0
P (x+y)
1 + (1−β)Px(1−β)Py+N0




+
× f|hSR|2(x)f|hRD |2(y) dxdy. (25)
Using high SNR approximation for γD as given in (17), we can
write R¯sec as
R¯sec ≈ (1 − Pp,out)
×
∫ ∞
x=0
∫ ∞
y=0

1
2
log2

1 + ηβ(1−β)P |hSR|2|hRD|2N0(ηβ|hRD|2+(1−β))
1 + (1−β)P |hSR|
2
(1−β)P |hRD|2+N0



+
× f|hSR|2(x)f|hRD |2(y) dxdy. (26)
The expressions in (25) and (26) do not admit a closed form and
are intractable. Alternatively, we provide a closed-form lower
bound on (26) as given in the following Proposition. The lower
bound on the ergodic secrecy rate ensures the minimum ergodic
secrecy rate under all possible channel conditions for a given
set of parameters.5
Proposition 4. The ergodic secrecy rate R¯sec in (26) is lower
bounded as
R¯sec ≥ (1− Pp,out)max
(
1
2 ln(2)
(T1 − T2), 0
)
, (27)
5Such guarantee of minimum performance is a useful criterion in the design
of a secure communication system.
6Fig. 3. Time switching policy for the secure communication via an energy
harvesting untrusted relay.
where
T1 ≥ ln
(
1 + exp
(
−2φ− ln
(
1
mxmz
))
+exp
(
1
mz
)
+ Ei
(
−
1
mz
))
(28a)
and
T2 =


1 + 1
mx
exp
(
1
mx
)
Ei
(
− 1
mx
)
,
my
mx
= 1
mx
mx−my
[
exp
(
1
my
)
Ei
(
− 1
my
)
− exp
(
1
mx
)
Ei
(
− 1
mx
)]
,
my
mx
6= 1,
(28b)
with mx = (1−β)PλSRN0 , my =
(1−β)PλRD
N0
, mz =
ηβλRD
1−β ,
φ ≈ 0.577215, is the Euler’s constant [55, 9.73], and Ei(x) =
−
∫∞
−x (exp(−t)/t) dt, is the exponential integral [55, 8.21].
Proof: See Appendix D.
The lower bound given in (27) is tight in high SNR regime,
which is depicted in Fig. 8 of Section V. Proposition 4 shows
that the ergodic secrecy rate depends on the power splitting
factor β, energy conversion efficiency factor η, and mean
channel gains of source-to-relay and relay-to-destination links.
IV. TIME SWITCHING POLICY BASED RELAYING
Fig. 3 shows the time switching (TS) policy based relaying
protocol for the secure communication via untrusted relay. The
communication between the source and the destination happens
over two hops and in a duration of T . The relay harvests energy
for αT duration (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) from the received RF signals.
The relay spends its harvested energy to forward the received
information from the source to the destination. The remaining
(1 − α)T duration is further split in two sub-slots of equal
duration of (1−α)T2 . In the first sub-slot, the source transmits
the information to relay, which is forwarded to the destination
in the second sub-slot after the amplification. The destination
sends a jamming signal during the source-to-relay transmission.
A. Energy Harvesting at Relay
For the aforementioned TS policy, the energy EH harvested
during αT duration is given by
EH = ηαT
(
PS |hSR|
2 + PD|hDR|
2
)
. (29)
The relay uses this harvested energy to forward the source
information to the destination with power given by
PH =
EH
(1 − α)T/2
=
2ηα
(
PS |hSR|
2 + PD|hDR|
2
)
1− α
. (30)
B. Information Processing and Relaying Protocol
After the energy harvesting phase, the relay switches to
information processing phase, where the received signal is given
by
yR =
√
PShSRxS +
√
PDhDRxD + nR. (31)
Note that, unless otherwise stated, all notations in this section
have the same meanings as they have in Section III on the
power splitting policy based relaying. Using the received signal
yR given in (31), the relay may attempt to decode source
information. The received SNR at the relay is given by
γR =
PS |hSR|
2
PD|hDR|2 +N0
. (32)
The relay forwards the amplified version of the received signal
to the destination, which is given by
xR = ξyR =
√
PH
PS |hSR|2 + PD|hDR|2 +N0
yR. (33)
Then the received signal y′D at the destination is given by
y′D = hRDxR + nD. (34)
After subtracting the term corresponding to the known jamming
signal xD , the resultant received signal yD at the destination
becomes
yD = ξ
√
PShSRhRDxS + ξhRDnR + nD. (35)
Substituting PH from (30) in (33), and then ξ from (33) in (35),
we can write the received signal yD as
yD =
√
2ηαPS (PS |hSR|2 + PD|hDR|2)hSRhRDxS√
(1− α)(PS |hSR|2 + PD|hDR|2 +N0)
+
√
2ηα (PS |hSR|2 + PD|hDR|2)hRDnR√
(1 − α)(PS |hSR|2 + PD|hDR|2 +N0)
+ nD. (36)
The first term on the right hand side of (36) represents the
received signal part at the destination, while the last two terms
represent the overall noise at the destination. Thus, we can write
the received SNR at the destination as
γD =
2ηαPS |hSR|
2|hRD|
2
2ηα|hRD|2N0 +N0(1− α) +
N20 (1−α)
(PS |hSR|2+PD |hDR|2)
.
(37)
For the rest of the Section IV, we assume PS = PD = P for
analytical tractability.
C. Secure Communication Via an Untrusted Relay
For the proposed TS policy, the instantaneous secrecy rate
can be given by
Rsec =
(1− α)
2
[
log2 (1 + γD)− log2 (1 + γR)
]+
=
(1− α)
2
[
log2
(
1 + γD
1 + γR
)]+
, (38)
where γR and γD are given by (32) and (37), respectively.
The factor (1− α)/2 denotes the effective time of information
transmission between source and destination.
71) Secrecy Outage Probability: We can express the secrecy
outage probability as given in the Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. For TS policy, given the energy harvesting
circuitry of the relay is active, the secrecy outage probability
is analytically given by (15), where δ = 2 2Rth1−α with
θ1 =
(δ − 1) +
√
(δ − 1)2 + 4δ P (1−α)2ηαN0
2(P/N0)
, (39)
and
ν(x) =
(
2ηαPx
N0 (2ηαx+ (1− α))
−
Pδ
Px+N0
)
. (40)
Proof: The proof follows the same steps used in Ap-
pendix A to derive the secrecy outage probability for PS policy
in Proposition 1. Thus, we skip the proof for TS policy for
brevity.
Note that, for TS policy, the secrecy outage probability
under high SNR approximation as given by (15) is obtained
by approximating the exact expression of γD in (37) as
γD ≈
2ηαP |hSR|
2|hRD|
2
N0 (2ηα|hRD|2 + (1− α))
, (41)
where we have used the channel reciprocity, i.e., hRD = hDR.
We have obtained (41) from the exact expression of received
SNR at the destination given in (37) by neglecting the term
N20 (1−α)
(PS |hSR|2+PD |hDR|2)
in the denominator of (37) due to negli-
gible value of N20 at high SNR. Now, considering the power
outage probability, we can finally write the total secrecy outage
probability as (20). Note that the power outage probability for
PS and TS policies is the same.
2) Probability of Positive Secrecy Rate: The following
proposition gives the analytical expression for Ppos.
Proposition 6. We can write Ppos as (21), where θ2 = A, θ3
is given by (22b) with A = N0(1−α)2ηαP and B =
N20 (1−α)
2ηαP 2 , and
ψ(x) =
N20
P
(
2ηα
1−αPx
2 −N0
) − x.
Proof:
The proof follows the same steps used in Appendix C for PS
policy. We skip the proof for TS policy for brevity.
3) Ergodic Secrecy Rate: With the inclusion of the power
outage probability Pp,out given in (19), the ergodic secrecy rate
is calculated by averaging the instantaneous secrecy rate over
all possible channel realizations and is given as
R¯sec = (1− Pp,out)E{Rsec}
= (1− Pp,outE
{
(1− α)
2
[
log2
(
1 + γD
1 + γR
)]+}
. (42)
Using (32) and (37) in (42), we can write the analytical
expression for R¯sec as
R¯sec= (1− Pp,out)
×
∫ ∞
x=0
∫ ∞
y=0

(1− α)2 log2


1 + 2ηαPxy
2ηαN0y+N0(1−α)+
N20 (1−α)
P (x+y)
1 + Px
Py+N0




+
× f|hSR|2(x)f|hRD|2(y) dxdy. (43)
Using high SNR approximation for γD as given in (41), we can
write R¯sec as
R¯sec ≈ (1− Pp,out)
×
∫ ∞
x=0
∫ ∞
y=0
[
(1− α)
2
log2
(
1 + 2ηαPxy2ηαN0y+N0(1−α)
1 + Px
Py+N0
)]+
× f|hSR|2(x)f|hRD|2(y) dxdy. (44)
Both (43) and (44) do not admit a closed form. Alternatively,
we present a closed-form lower bound on (44) as given in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 7. We lower bound the ergodic secrecy rate R¯sec
in (44) by
R¯sec ≥ (1− Pp,out)max
(
1− α
2 ln(2)
(T1 − T2), 0
)
, (45)
where T1 and T2 are given by (28a) and (28b), respectively,
with mx = PλSRN0 , my =
PλRD
N0
, and mz = 2ηαλRD1−α .
Proof: The proof follows the same steps used in Ap-
pendix D to derive the lower bound on ergodic secrecy capacity
for PS policy in Proposition 4. Thus, we skip the proof for TS
policy for brevity.
The lower bound given in (45) is tight in high SNR regime,
which is depicted in Fig. 8 of Section V.
V. DISCUSSIONS AND RESULTS
In this section, we numerically investigate the secrecy per-
formance of source-destination communication via an untrusted
wireless energy harvesting relay. For different system param-
eters like the power splitting ratio, energy harvesting time,
transmit SNR, source-relay and relay-destination distances, tar-
get secrecy rate, path-loss exponent, and the energy conversion
efficiency factor, we discuss how they impact the secrecy outage
probability and ergodic secrecy rate under both PS and TS
policies.
A. System Parameters and Simulation Setup
Unless otherwise stated, we consider following system pa-
rameters. The source power and destination jamming signal
power, PS = PD = P = 40 dBm; energy conversion effi-
ciency, η = 0.7; energy harvesting circuitry activation threshold,
θH = −30 dBm [3], [51]; and noise power, N0 = 10−4. The
distances between source and relay and that between relay and
destination are 5m each, i.e., dSR = dRD = 5m. The mean
channel power gains λSR and λRD of the exponential random
variables |hSR|2 and |hRD|2 are d−ρSR and d
−ρ
RD, respectively,
where ρ is the path-loss exponent. Unless otherwise stated,
ρ = 2.7.
B. Effect of power splitting ratio β and energy harvesting time
α
1) Effect of β: Fig. 4 shows the effects of the power splitting
ratio β under PS policy and the energy harvesting time α under
TS policy on the secrecy outage probability. For PS policy,
with the increase in β, the secrecy outage probability initially
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Fig. 4. Effect of the power splitting ratio β and the energy harvesting time α
for PS and TS policies, respectively, on the secrecy outage probability, Rth =
0.5 bits/s/Hz.
decreases to a minimum value. The value of β corresponding
to the minimum secrecy outage probability is the optimal value
of β. If we increase β further beyond the optimal value, the
secrecy outage probability also increases. This is because, as
β increases, the relay harvests more energy, which in turn,
increases the relay’s transmit power improving the information
reception at the destination. Also, the increased β reduces the
received signal strength at the relay which degrades the received
SNR γR at the relay. This enhances the secrecy rate of the
communication which reduces the secrecy outage probability.
But, once β crosses the optimal value, the poor signal strength
at the relay delivers a negative effect on the secrecy outage
probability. Due to the amplification of the poor received signal,
the relay forwards a noisy signal to the destination which
reduces the received SNR γD at the destination. The increased
harvested energy due to the increased β, in turn, the higher
transmit power of the relay, cannot compensate the loss in γD
because of the reduced signal strength. This pushes the secret
source-destination communication into the outage more often,
increasing the secrecy outage probability. On the similar line, for
Fig. 5, we can explain the initial increase of the ergodic secrecy
rate with β and then its fall after the optimal β. Figs. 4 and 5
also show that the simulation results are in excellent agreement
with analytical results.
2) Effect of α: Fig. 4 shows that, for TS policy, as the energy
harvesting time α increases, the secrecy outage probability
reduces initially and reaches the minimum value for the optimal
value of α. However, the secrecy outage probability begins
to increase as α increases beyond its optimal value. This is
because, as α increases, the relay spends more time on the
energy harvesting, which in turn, increases its transmit power
improving the received SNR at the destination. Meanwhile,
the increase in α reduces the time available for information
processing at both the relay and destination. Now, at the relay,
the reduced time for information processing has two opposite
effects on the secrecy outage probability. Firstly, it degrades
the reception of the signal at the relay and thus deteriorates
the eavesdropping channel of the relay improving the secrecy
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Fig. 5. Effect of the power splitting ratio β and the energy harvesting time α
for PS and TS policies, respectively, on the ergodic secrecy rate.
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Fig. 6. Effect of target secrecy rate on the optimal secrecy outage probability
for PS and TS policies.
outage probability. On the contrary, since the relay amplifies
and forwards the received signal to the destination, the reception
at the destination also degrades. Now, when α is less than its
optimal value and increasing, the positive effects due to the
increased harvested energy at the relay and deterioration of the
eavesdropping channel are dominant, and the secrecy outage
probability reduces. Once α crosses the optimal value, the
effect of the reduced time for information processing becomes
dominant, increasing the secrecy outage probability. Similarly,
for Fig. 5, we can explain the initial increase of the ergodic
secrecy rate with α and then its fall after the optimal α.
C. Effect of Target Secrecy Rate Rth
Fig. 6 plots the optimal secrecy outage probability versus
the target secrecy rate Rth. As the required secrecy rate con-
straint becomes tighter, the optimal secrecy outage probability
increases. This is because, the higher Rth is set, the more it
becomes difficult to satisfy, and the likelihood of the secure
communication between the source and the destination running
into the outage increases. Fig. 6 also shows that TS policy
achieves lower secrecy outage probability at low Rth (till
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Fig. 7. Optimal secrecy outage probability versus transmit SNR (P/N0) for
PS and TS policies, N0 = −10 dBm.
0.5 bits/s/Hz) than that of PS policy. On the contrary, at higher
secrecy rate constraint, PS policy outperforms TS policy.
D. Effect of Transmit Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)
Fig. 7 illustrates the effect of the transmit SNR, i.e., P/N0,
on the optimal secrecy outage probability for both PS and TS
policies. For a fixed noise power N0, the variation in transmit
SNR is equivalent to the variation of source’s and destination’s
power P . The increase in transmit SNR has its constructive
as well as destructive effects on the secure communication.
The increase in transmit SNR increases the signal strengths of
both information signal from the source and jamming signal
from the destination. From the expressions of received SNR
γR at the relay given by (5) and (32) for PS and TS policies,
respectively, we can note that γR increases with the increase in
transmit SNR. This increases the chances of the untrusted relay
decoding the information, which leads to the increase in the
secrecy outage probability. On the other hand, the increase in
transmit SNR increases the energy harvested by the relay due to
higher received powers from information and jamming signals.
This causes an increase in the relay’s transmit power, which
improves SNR at the destination. Also, when relay amplifies
and forwards its received signal to the destination, the signal
strength is further improved due to the increased signal strength
at the relay as a result of the increased transmit SNR. As Fig. 7
shows, the increase in transmit SNR has an overall positive
impact on the secrecy performance of the system.
Similarly, Fig. 8 shows that the optimal ergodic secrecy rate
improves with the increase in transmit SNR. One interesting
observation is that, at lower transmit SNR values, TS policy
achieves better optimal ergodic secrecy rate than that of PS
policy. On the other hand, at higher transmit SNR, PS policy
attains higher ergodic secrecy rate compared to TS policy.
From Fig. 8, we can note that, with the increase in transmit
SNR, the performance with the closed-form lower bound on
the ergodic secrecy rate approaches the performance with the
exact analytical expression. Thus, the closed-form lower bound
is tight at high transmit SNR for both PS and TS policies.
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Fig. 9. Effect of relay placement on the optimal secrecy outage probability
for PS and TS policies with different path-loss exponents ρ = 2.7, 4.
E. Effect of Relay Placement
Fig. 9 depicts the effect of the relay placement on the optimal
secrecy outage probability for different target secrecy rates and
path-loss exponents ρ under both PS and TS policies. We
vary the source-relay distance dSR, while the relay-destination
distance dRD is 10 − dSR. The values of path-loss exponent
ρ considered are ρ = 2.7 and 4. Before discussing Fig. 9,
it is important to understand how dSR affects the secrecy
performance in both constructive and destructive ways. Under
both PS and TS policies, as dSR increases, the received infor-
mation signal strength at the relay decreases due to the higher
path-loss d−ρSR. This discourages the eavesdropping intention of
the untrusted relay, improving the secrecy performance. Also,
as dSR increases, the relay-destination distance dRD reduces,
which makes the received jamming signal at the relay stronger.
This further enhances the secrecy performance. The decrease in
dRD brings the relay closer to the destination due to which the
lesser amount of harvested energy is sufficient to perform the
reliable communication between relay and destination because
of the reduced path-loss d−ρRD . This saving in the energy is
important as, the energy harvested by the relay decreases with
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Fig. 10. Effect of relay placement on the optimal ergodic secrecy rate for PS
and TS policies with different path-loss exponents ρ = 2.7, 4.
the increase in dSR. Another negative effect of the increased
dSR on the secrecy performance is that, due to the amplify-and-
forward nature of the relay, as the received signal strength at the
relay reduces with the increase in dSR, the information signal
strength at the destination also deteriorates. This reduces the
secrecy rate and thus increases the secrecy outage probability.
Fig. 9 shows that the constructive effects of the increase in
dSR overtake its destructive effects irrespective of the secrecy
rate threshold Rth under both PS and TS policies and the
optimal secrecy outage probability decreases monotonically
with the increase in dSR. Thus, the optimum placement of
the relay is closer to the destination. Note that, in the case of
wireless energy harvesting communication via a relay without
secrecy constraints, the optimum relay placement is close to the
source [8]. But, as shown in Figs. 9 and 10, to have secure
communication, the relay placement close to the source is not
preferred.
Fig. 10 shows that, for the optimal ergodic secrecy rate, the
relay placement has similar effects on the secrecy performance
as that on the optimal secrecy outage probability. One interesting
observation is that, with the variation in dSR, there exists a
crossover point between PS and TS policies, and the location
of the crossover point depends on the path-loss exponent. For
example, for the path-loss exponent ρ = 2.7, TS policy achieves
higher optimal ergodic secrecy rate than that of PS policy below
dSR = 2m, i.e., the crossover occurs at dSR = 2m; while for
ρ = 4, TS policy achieves higher optimal ergodic secrecy rate
than that of PS policy below dSR = 8m, i.e., the crossover
occurs at dSR = 8m. This is because, at a given path-loss
exponent, below the crossover point, the loss in information
processing time due to the energy harvesting time in TS policy is
lesser than the loss incurred in the relay’s transmit power due to
power splitting in PS policy. As the distance between relay and
destination decreases (with the increase in dSR), the relay may
transmit with lower power due to lower path-loss. This subsides
the loss incurred in power splitting in PS policy compared to
the loss in time for TS policy, and PS policy outperforms TS
policy at higher dSR. The increase in path-loss exponent delays
the arrival of the crossover point, because, for higher path-loss
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Fig. 12. Effect of the energy conversion efficiency factor η (a) on the optimal
secrecy outage probability, (b) on the optimal ergodic secrecy rate.
exponent, the distance between relay and destination should
be lower than that in the case of lower path-loss exponent
to subside the loss incurred in power splitting. This effect of
path-loss exponent on the optimal ergodic secrecy rate can
also be seen in Fig. 11 for different source-relay distances. In
addition to the effect of the path-loss exponent on the crossover
point, Fig. 11 shows that the increase in path-loss exponent is
detrimental for the secure communication.
F. Effect of Energy Conversion Efficiency Factor η
The energy conversion efficiency factor η determines what
fraction of the received power the relay can actually harvest.
Thus, higher η allows relay to harvest more energy, which in
turn, boosts relay’s transmit power. This results in the enhanced
received SNR at the destination, reducing the secrecy outage
probability and improving the ergodic secrecy rate, as shown
in Figs. 12(a) and 12(b), respectively. At lower η, TS policy
achieves better optimal ergodic secrecy rate than that of PS
policy and the trend reverses at higher η.
11
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have investigated the secrecy performance of the source-
destination communication via an energy harvesting amplify-
and-forward untrusted relay. The energy-starved relay harvests
energy from the received radio-frequency signals. In this case,
besides keeping the information confidential from the untrusted
relay, the destination-assisted jamming signal supplies energy
to relay. This energy augments the energy harvested from the
received information signal. The PS and TS policies at the relay
enable it to harvest energy and process the received informa-
tion. For this proposed scenario, we have derived analytical
expressions for two secrecy metrics, viz., the secrecy outage
probability and the ergodic secrecy rate.
The numerical study of the aforementioned secrecy metrics
against different system parameters provides useful design in-
sights. For instance, the variation of power splitting ratio in
PS policy and energy harvesting time in TS policy affect the
secrecy performance in both constructive and destructive ways.
Thus, the optimal power splitting ratio and the optimal energy
harvesting time exist, that maximize the secrecy performance in
terms of both secrecy metrics. The optimal values of secrecy
metrics depend on the system parameters. For example, the
higher target secrecy rate we set, the more it becomes difficult to
achieve, increasing the optimal secrecy outage probability. Also,
at higher target secrecy rate, PS policy outperforms TS policy
by achieving the lower optimal secrecy outage probability.
Though the increase in transmit SNR increases the possibility of
relay decoding the confidential information, the resulting higher
harvested energy and the jamming power dominate the negative
effect. Thus, the increase in transmit SNR is beneficial to the
secure communication. We also observe that, for high transmit
SNR, PS policy achieves better ergodic secrecy rate than that
of TS policy. The relay location is important in the secure
communication. In general, having relay located away from the
source is beneficial to keep the information confidential from
the relay. This is in contrast with the case of trusted energy
harvesting relay, where the relay is preferred to be placed closer
to the source. Finally, higher energy conversion efficiency factor
increases the harvested energy by the relay, which in turn,
improves secrecy performance. In particular, at higher energy
conversion efficiency factor, PS policy achieves better optimal
ergodic secrecy rate than that of TS policy.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF (15)
At high SNR, using the channel reciprocity between relay
and destination and substituting γR from (5) and γD from (17)
in (12), and then using (12) and (13), we can write the secrecy
outage probability for PS policy as
Pout = P

1 + ηβ(1−β)P |hSR|2|hRD|2N0(ηβ|hRD|2+(1−β))
1 + (1−β)P |hSR|
2
(1−β)P |hRD|2+N0
< δ

 ,
= P
(
ν(X)|hSR|
2 < δ − 1
) ∣∣∣∣X=|hRD|2 , (46)
where
ν(x) = (1− β)
(
ηβPx
N0 (ηβx + (1− β))
−
Pδ
P (1 − β)x+N0
)
.
(47)
Based on the sign of ν(X), we split (46) as
Pout = P
(
|hSR|
2 <
δ − 1
ν(X)
∣∣∣∣ν(X) ≥ 0
)
P (ν(X) ≥ 0)
+ P
(
|hSR|
2 ≥
δ − 1
ν(X)
∣∣∣∣ν(X) < 0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
P (ν(X) < 0) . (48)
In (48), P
(
|hSR|
2 ≥ δ−1
ν(X)
∣∣∣∣ν(X) < 0
)
= 1, because |hSR|2
being an exponential random variable always takes non-negative
values. Also, we have
ν(x)
{
≥ 0, if θ1 ≤ x <∞
< 0, if 0 ≤ x < θ1,
(49)
where
θ1 =
δ−1
1−β +
√(
δ−1
1−β
)2
+ 4δ P
ηβN0
2(P/N0)
. (50)
Note that θ1 is the positive root of the equation ν(x) = 0.
Using (49), we can write (48) as
Pout =
∫ ∞
θ1
(
1− exp
(
−
δ − 1
ν(x)λSR
))
fX(x) dx +
∫ θ1
0
fX(x) dx,
=
∫ θ1
0
fX(x) dx +
∫ ∞
θ1
fX(x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
−
∫ ∞
θ1
(
exp
(
−
δ − 1
ν(x)λSR
))
fX(x) dx. (51)
Substituting fX(x) = 1λRD exp
(
− x
λRD
)
in the third integral
of (51), we reach the required expression of Pout as in (15).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We can write the power outage probability as
Pp,out = P (PR < θH)
= P
(
P (|hSR|
2 + |hRD|
2) < θH
)
= P
(
(|hSR|
2 + |hRD|
2) <
θH
P
)
. (52)
Let Z =
(
|hSR|
2 + |hRD|
2
)
. Since |hSR|2 and |hRD|2 are
exponentially distributed random variables with means λSR and
λRD , we can write the probability density function of Z as [56]
fZ(z) =


exp
(
− z
λSR
)
λSR−λRD
+
exp
(
− z
λRD
)
λRD−λSR
, if λSR 6= λRD(
1
λSR
)2
z exp
(
− z
λSR
)
, if λSR = λRD.
(53)
12
Note that Z can take only non-negative values as it is the sum
of two exponential random variables. Using (53) in (52), we can
write
Pp,out = P
(
Z <
θH
P
)
=
∫ θH
P
0
fZ(z)dz. (54)
Evaluating the integral in (54), we get the required expression
for the power outage probability as in (19).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
A. Proof of (21a)
We can write the probability of achieving the positive secrecy
capacity as
Ppos = (1− Pp,out)P (Rsec > 0)
= (1− Pp,out)P
(
1
2
log2
[
(1 + γD)
(1 + γR)
]+
> 0
)
= (1− Pp,out)P (γD > γR) . (55)
Substituting γR from (5) and γD from (11) in (55) , we obtain
P (γD > γR) = P
[((
|hSR|
2 + |hRD|
2
)
× P (1− β)
(
ηβP |hRD|
4 −N0
))
> N20
]
. (56)
Then we can write
P (γD > γR) =
∫ θ2
0
F|hSR|2(ψ(x))f|hRD |2(x) dx
+
∫ θ3
θ2
[
1− F|hSR|2(ψ(x))
]
f|hRD|2(x) dx
+
∫ ∞
θ3
[
1− F|hSR|2(ψ(x))
]
f|hRD|2(x) dx
=
1
λRD
∫ θ3
θ2
exp
(
−
(
ψ(x)
λSR
+
x
λRD
))
dx
+ exp
(
−
θ3
λRD
)
, (57)
where
ψ(x) =
N20
P (1− β)(ηβPx2 −N0)
− x (58)
with
ψ(x)


< 0, 0 ≤ x < θ2,
≥ 0, θ2 ≤ x ≤ θ3,
< 0, θ3 < x <∞.
(59)
θ2 is the positive root of the equation g(x) = ηβPx2−N0 = 0,
and is given as
θ2 =
√
N0
ηβP
, (60)
while θ3 is the real root of ψ(x) = 0 which is a cubic equation
given as
x3 −Ax− B = 0, (61)
where A = N0
ηβP
and B = N
2
0
ηβ(1−β)P 2 . We obtain the solution
to (61) using Cardano’s formula [57], which allows us to find
the real root of (61). The solution is given as
θ3 =

B
2
+
√(
B
2
)2
+
(
−
A
3
)3
1
3
+

B
2
−
√(
B
2
)2
+
(
−
A
3
)3
1
3
. (62)
Substituting (57) in (55), we get the exact expression of the
probability of positive secrecy rate given in (21a).
B. Proof of (21b)
Under high SNR approximation of γD given in (17), using
(55), we can write the probability of positive secrecy rate as
Ppos = (1− Pp,out)
× P
(
ηβ(1 − β)P |hSR|
2|hRD|
2
N0 (ηβ|hRD |2 + (1 − β))
>
(1 − β)P |hSR|
2
(1 − β)P |hRD|2 +N0
)
,
(63)
where we have used γR from (5) with PS = PD = P
and hDR = hRD (channel reciprocity between relay and
destination). Simplifying (63), we obtain
Ppos = (1− Pp,out)P
(
|hRD|
2 >
√
N0
ηβP
)
= (1− Pp,out) exp
(
−
√
θ2
λ2RD
)
, (64)
where θ2 = N0ηβP .
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
For PS policy, we can write the ergodic secrecy rate as
R¯sec = (1− Pp,out)E
{
1
2
[
log2
(
1 + γD
1 + γR
)]+}
(65)
(a)
≥ (1− Pp,out)
[
E
{
1
2
log2
(
1 + γD
1 + γR
)}]+
(b)
= (1− Pp,out)max
(
1
2 ln(2)
[
E
{
ln
(
1 +
XZ
Z + 1
)}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
− E
{
ln
(
1 +
X
Y + 1
)}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
]
, 0
)
, (66)
where X = (1−β)P |hSR|
2
N0
, Y = (1−β)P |hRD|
2
N0
, and Z =
ηβ|hRD|
2
1−β are the exponential random variables with means
mx =
(1−β)PλSR
N0
, my =
(1−β)PλRD
N0
, and mz = ηβλRD1−β ,
respectively. The inequality (a) is obtained by using the fact
13
E {max(U, V )} ≥ max (E {U} ,E {V }). Also, to obtain equal-
ity (b), we have used γR from (5) and γD from (17). We can
further lower bound T1 as
T1 = E
{
ln
(
1 +
XZ
Z + 1
)}
= E
{
ln
(
1 + exp
(
ln
(
XZ
Z + 1
)))}
(c)
≥ ln
(
1 + exp
(
E
{
ln
(
XZ
Z + 1
)}))
= ln

1 + exp

E {ln (XZ)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
J1
−E {ln (Z + 1)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
J2



 ,
(67)
where we have used the convexity of ln(1+ t exp(x)) for t > 0
and Jensen’s inequality to obtain inequality (c). We write
J1 = E {ln (XZ)} =
∫ ∞
x=0
∫ ∞
z=0
ln(xz)fX(x)fZ (z) dxdz,
which can be further be written in a compact form using [55,
4.331.1] as
J1 = −2φ− ln
(
1
mxmz
)
, (68)
where φ is the Euler’s constant [55, 9.73]. We can write J2 as
J2 = E {ln (Z + 1)} =
∫ ∞
z=0
ln(z + 1)fZ(z) dz, (69)
which we can write using [55, 4.337.2] as
J2 = − exp
(
1
mz
)
Ei
(
−
1
mz
)
, (70)
where Ei(x) is the exponential integral [55, 8.21]. Substituting
(68) and (70) in (67), we get the required lower bound for T1.
We can rewrite T2 as
T2 = E {ln (1 + γR)} =
∫ ∞
u=0
ln(1 + u)fγR(u) du. (71)
Using the integration by parts method, we can rewrite (71) as
T2 =
∫ ∞
u=0
1
1 + u
[1− FγR(u)] du, (72)
where we can write the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
FγR(u) as
FγR(u) =
∫ ∞
y=0
FX((1 + y)u)fY (y) dy
=
1
my
∫ ∞
y=0
[
1− exp
(
−
(1 + y)u
mx
)]
exp
(
−
y
my
)
dy
= 1−
mx
mx + umy
exp
(
−
u
mx
)
. (73)
Substituting (73) in (72) and using [55, 3.353.3] and [55,
3.352.4], we finally obtain the required expression for T2 as
in (28b).
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